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DISABLING THE GENDER PAY GAP:
LESSONS FROM THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
MICHELLE A. TRAVISt
ABSTRACT
As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII's prohibition
against sex-based compensation discrimination in the workplace, the
gender wage gap remains robust and progress toward gender pay equity
has stalled. This Article reveals the role that causal narratives play in
undermining the law's potential for reducing the gender pay gap. The
most recent causal narrative is illustrated by the "women don't ask" and
"lean in" storylines, which reveal our society's entrenched view that
women themselves are responsible for their own pay inequality. This
causal narrative has also embedded itself in subtle but pernicious ways in
antidiscrimination doctrine, which helps shield employers from legal
liability for gender pay disparities.
The disability civil rights movement has faced a similar challenge,
and its successful response provides a potential path forward on gender
pay issues. The causal narrative that erected barriers for disability rights
was engrained in the medical model of disability, which also identified
internal deficits as the source of individuals' own limitations. The disa-
bility rights movement responded with a reconceptualized "social mod-
el," which explains disability instead as the result of the environment in
which an individual's characteristics interact. The social model of disa-
bility provides an alternative causal narrative: one that shifts focus onto
the role played by employer practices and organizational norms in pro-
ducing inequality. This Article explores how a social model approach to
women's compensation could help shift the causal focus away from the
manner in which women negotiate and onto the institutional practices
that produce unequal results. In doing so, the social model may help re-
suscitate Title VII's disparate impact heory to allow challenges to em-
ployment practices that base compensation on employees' individual
demands, thereby moving us toward more effective structural solutions
to the gender pay divide.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, progress on the overall gender wage gap has
come to a virtual standstill.' For full-time, year-round workers in 2012,
the median salary for women was 76.5% of the median salary for men-
2a gap that was nearly identical to the gap reported in 2001. Gender pay
disparity is much larger for some women than others, particularly for
women of color,3 and it exists even after controlling for factors such as
education, skill level, and hours worked.4 If the overall rate of change
from 1960 to 2012 remains the same in the future, most women in the
paid labor market today will never experience gender wage parity during
their working lives.5 At the same time that we are celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in the
workplace,6 experts are actually extending their projections for the length
7of time that it will take to eventually close the gender pay gap.
Although designing successful legal tools to combat the gender pay
gap does not necessarily require a complete understanding of why the
1. See Meghan Casserly, The Geography of the Gender Pay Gap: Women's Earnings by
State, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://www. forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2013/09/19/the-geography-of-the-gender-pay-gap-
womens-earnings-by-state/ ("For more than a decade now, the comparison between the median
earnings of full-time employed men and women in the U.S. has remained a stubborn 77% ....");
Ben Penn, Gender Pay Gap Won't Close Until 2058, IWPF Projects, as Democrats Push for Law,
DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 18, 2013, at A-12 ("While women have made tremendous strides in their
earnings relative to men since 1960, none of that progress has taken place since 2000 .... ").
2. See Penn, supra note 1, at A-12.
3. On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity)-for Now, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 11,
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/I i/on-pay-gap-millennial-women-near-parity-for-
now/ (providing details about the gender wage gap based on survey data from October 2013).
4. See Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1049-51
(2012) (summarizing the "great deal of evidence that women ... still experience large pay gaps,"
even when controlling for other factors).
5. See Penn, supra note 1, at A-12; see also Jillian Berman, Gender Pay Gap Likely Won't
Go Away Until After You Retire: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:42 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/gender-pay-gap-close_n 3975638.html.
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
7. See Berman, supra note 5.
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gap exists, causal narratives have played an enormously influential role
in Title VII's relative lack of success in the arena of sex-based wage dis-
crimination. Because both our social and our legal assessments of re-
sponsibility typically follow our attributions of causation, causal narra-
tives are powerful tools for shaping the law's effect, whether or not our
causal assessments are accurate, sufficiently nuanced, or legally rele-
vant. According to social scientists who study causal attribution theo-
ry-i.e., the cognitive processes by which we arrive at explanations for
social events9-we are not exceptionally skilled at this task. Although
our causal attribution process is efficient, often unconscious, and highly
adaptive, it is also systematically biased.0
One causal attribution bias is toward oversimplification, which of-
ten shows up when several causes are necessary for an event or outcome
to occur." Tort law refers to this scenario as one involving "multiple
necessary causes."'2 In such a scenario, we tend to single out and identify
one of the multiple necessary circumstances as the cause, which then
becomes the target for placing responsibility, be it credit or blame.13 The
gender pay gap is just such a multi-causal social phenomenon. The resili-
ence of the gender pay gap has been fueled in part by simplified-and
strategic-causal narratives that have directed responsibility away from
the employers that have built, entrenched, and sustained gender pay me-
8. See Michelle A. Travis, The PDA's Causation Effect: Observations of an Unreasonable
Woman, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 53-54 (2009); see also STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF
THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE 232 (2007) ("Our concept of causation
is indispensable to our attribution of credit and blame in everyday life.").
9. See Travis, supra note 8, at 54 ("Causal attribution theory is the branch of social cognition
theory that studies the process by which people arrive at explanations for social events."); see also
MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS
37-38 (1989) (describing causal attribution theory); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 337, 338-39, 348-49 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978) (same); Michelle A. Travis,
Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 509-10
(2002) [hereinafter Travis, Perceived Disabilities] (same).
10. Travis, supra note 8, at 54; see also HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 61 (describing the adap-
tive but biased nature of our causal attribution processes); Travis, Perceived Disabilities, supra note
9, at 509-42 (summarizing the social science research on causal attribution biases).
I1. See PINKER, supra note 8, at 213.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 26 cmts. c, i, 27 cmts. d, e (2010); see also John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of the
Bramble Bush: The "But For" Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Insti-
tute's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2709 & n.232 (2003)
(describing the Restatement's distinction between multiple necessary causes, which are "members of
a causal set which are in themselves necessary to cause the harm, even if they are insufficient to do
so by themselves," and multiple sufficient causes, which "occur where there are two forces, operat-
ing independently, and each is sufficient to cause the harm"); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra
Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual "But For" and Causal Reasoning: Experimental
Findings and Implications for Jurors' Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 251-52 (2001)
(distinguishing multiple necessary cause situations in which several causes "are necessary but nei-
ther alone is sufficient," from multiple sufficient cause situations in which either of two causes
would be sufficient by itself to produce the outcome but "neither alone is necessary").
13. See PINKER, supra note 8, at 213-14 ("People somehow distinguish just one of the neces-
sary conditions for an event as its cause and the others as mere enablers.., even when all are equal-
ly necessary.").
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quality as a standard feature of the American workplace. This Article
explores this important role that causal narratives play in sustaining the
gender compensation divide. 4
Social psychologists generally characterize causal attributions as ei-
ther "internal" or "external."'15 Internal attributions are ones that identify
the primary cause of a social event as some characteristic, feature, or trait
of an actor involved in the event, while external attributions are ones that
identify the primary cause as some aspect of the situation or environment
in which the event took place.'6 When an observer concludes that a par-
ticular outcome was caused by an actor's effort, intelligence, ability,
attitude, personality, emotions, or physical or mental condition, the ob-
server is making an internal attribution.17 If the observer instead deems
the cause to be the weather conditions or the difficulty of the task, for
example, an external attribution is being made.'8 In other words, internal
causal attributions focus on "something about the person," while external
causal attributions focus on "something about the situation."'9
Under this taxonomy, internal causal attributions for the gender pay
gap focus on characteristics of the women who are being paid less than
men for their work. External causal attributions, in contrast, focus on
aspects of either of the two environments in which women are interact-
ing: aspects of the particular employer that is compensating women less
than men, or aspects of the broader labor market within which all em-
ployers and employees operate. When an employer is charged with sex-
based compensation discrimination, the employer thus has two targets for
shifting causal attribution away from itself: either to the labor market or
to the women who are being underpaid.
In Title VII's early years, employers successfully sold a narrative
that identified "the market" as the cause of the gender pay gap. Employ-
ers portrayed themselves as passive price-takers who simply set wages
based on external market forces, which resulted in lower pay for women
than for men. 2 Courts readily accepted this single, external causal attrib-
ution as a basis for shifting legal responsibility away from employers for
14. Cf Travis, supra note 8 (analyzing the role of causal attribution narratives in combating
pregnancy discrimination in the workplace).
15. See HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 30-31. This causal attribution dimension has also been
referred to as the "person" versus "environment" dimension, or the "dispositional" versus "situation-




19. See Christopher Peterson et al., The Attributional Style Questionnaire, 6 COGNITIVE
THERAPY& RES. 287, 288 (1982).
20. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 596 (2001) (review-
ing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS,
MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)) (describing the causal narrative "of
employers as passively paying the going rate for labor"--i.e., employers' assertion that "the 'market
made me do it"').
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sex-based compensation disparities.21 In 1999, however, two sociolo-
gists, Robert Nelson and William Bridges, published an influential em-
pirical analysis debunking that oversimplified causal narrative and re-
vealing the additional, necessary role played by employers' own wage
scales, personnel bureaucracies, and other organizational practices that
decouple individual employers' wages from labor market prices.22 Femi-
nist legal scholars quickly leveraged this research to help reveal the mul-
ti-causal nature of the gender pay gap and to challenge employers' mar-
ket-based defenses to gender pay discrimination claims.23 Nelson and
Bridges' research provided an empirical basis for undermining the causal
narrative that the market dictates employers' pay decisions, thereby mak-
ing more salient the necessary causal role of individual employers in
24sustaining the gender pay gap.
Employers then seized upon another oversimplified-and even
more strategic-causal narrative: one that focused instead on women
themselves. Early on, this causal narrative was framed in terms of wom-
en's "lack of interest" in and "choice" not to pursue high-paid positions
25and job opportunities. Courts also readily accepted this internal causal
attribution, once again allowing employers to evade legal responsibility
for sex-based compensation disparities.26 But although the lack of inter-
est causal narrative effectively shifted blame for between-job pay differ-
21. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 283, 348-49 (2003) (compiling case law allowing employers to use a market defense to Title VII
disparate impact claims alleging gender pay discrimination).
22. See ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 2-3, 8, 9, 14, 51, 76, 310, 313-15
(1999) (using in-depth case studies to show that much of the between-job gender pay gap cannot be
explained by external market forces); see also Chamallas, supra note 20, at 580 (describing how
Nelson and Bridges demonstrated that employers are not "merely following the market," but rather
that "a sizeable portion of the pay differential-resided in the employers' own actions in setting
internal pay scales to suit their organizations' needs and values").
23. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 600, 607, 612 (arguing that evidence identify-
ing a causal role for the gender pay gap within organizations "paves the way for disparate impact
theory under their new analysis of the causes of gender wage disparities").
24. See NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 51 (concluding from case study analysis that a
significant portion of the gender wage gap "arises inside or is perpetuated by employing organiza-
tions"); see also Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 807, 819
(2010) (arguing that because "[t]he market defense draws its strength from the assertion that wages
are determined by external forces," employers should no longer be able to use that defense once that
premise is "questioned by empirical analysis"); Travis, supra note 21, at 352 (explaining how Nel-
son and Bridges "provided a factual basis for undermining courts' causation analysis" through case
studies "identifying specific organizational practices that help generate gender pay differences").
25. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1990); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Blame Game: How the Rhetoric
of Choice Blames the Achievement Gap on Women, 8 F.I.U. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (2013) (demon-
strating how the "blame game" and the "autonomy myth" about women making unconstrained
choices that are free from gender stereotypes and norms contributes to our failure to scrutinize struc-
tural discrimination in the workplace (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348-49 (summarizing case law allowing employers to de-
fend gender pay discrimination claims by raising a "choice" or "lack of interest" defense (internal
quotation marks omitted)). See generally Schultz, supra note 25 (analyzing case law).
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entials, it could not address the gender pay gap that exists within the
same jobs and for employees with the same skills and education. That is
where the "women don't ask" causal narrative stepped in to fill the void.
The women don't ask narrative identifies women's inability or un-
willingness to negotiate for wage parity as the cause of the gender wage
gap. This internal causal attribution focusing on women as a source of
their own pay inequality has become deeply entrenched in our society,
internalized by women, and built into our antidiscrimination law in sub-
tle and pernicious ways. Moreover, unlike the external market narrative,
internal causal attributions are typically more difficult to disrupt. Actors
generally are more salient than the situations in which they act, so we are
biased toward overestimating the causal role of people's internal charac-
teristics and underestimating the causal role of situational factors that
27constrain behavior and dictate outcomes. This bias is so pervasive that
social scientists call it the "fundamental attribution error.'
28
This bias will make it difficult to launch a simple empirical attack
on the accuracy of the women don't ask causal narrative, in part because
a simple reading of the social science research does indeed demonstrate
differences in women's and men's wage negotiation approaches and re-
sults.29 The research also demonstrates, however, that women's wage
negotiation approaches are constrained by biased employment practices
and that women's wage negotiation results are negatively affected by
gender stereotypes,30 which certainly should be highlighted as part of a
strategy for disrupting the women don't ask causal story. But the depth
and pervasiveness of this narrative makes it unlikely that a major shift
will result solely from a more nuanced reading of the negotiation re-
search.
Combatting the causal attribution to women as the responsible
agents for the gender pay gap will require a broader theoretical tool. That
tool may be borrowed from the disability civil rights movement, which
has successfully achieved a very similar goal of disrupting a pervasive
internal causal narrative. That narrative was housed within the medical
model of disability, which-like the women don't ask narrative-
identified internal deficits within impaired individuals as the primary
source of employees' limitations.31 But unlike in the gender context,
where this type of internal causal narrative remains entirely acceptable,
27. See HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 50; see also Travis, Perceived Disabilities, supra note 9,
at 519-20 (describing the causal attribution bias by which we "overestimate the role of an actor's
internal, dispositional characteristics and... underestimate the power of the situation in controlling
the actor's behavior").
28. See Ross, supra note 9, at 348-49 (coining the term and noting that this robust bias "has
been noted by many theorists" and "disputed by few").
29. See infra notes 56, 134-35 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 75-78, 136-40 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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the disability civil rights movement has effectively shifted the causal
focus of inequality onto the workplace itself.
Disability theorists achieved this success by reconceptualizing disa-
bility under the "social model," which understands disability as the result
of the environment in which an impairment interacts.32 The social model
of disability provided a new causal narrative that shifted both the pub-
lic's attention and the law's focus onto the role of employer practices and
structures in producing inequality for individuals with impairments,
which are not themselves inherently limiting.33 In the same way, a social
model approach to women's compensation could shift the causal focus
away from women's own negotiation techniques and onto the institution-
al practices that render those non-inherently limiting approaches "disa-
bling" with respect to women's pay. In this way, the social model has the
potential to move us toward more effective structural solutions to gender
pay inequality, including resuscitating Title VII's disparate impact theory
to allow challenges to facially neutral practices that base compensation
on employees' individual wage demands or requests.
Part I begins by exploring the common ground that is shared by the
women's rights movement and the disability rights movement-both of
which must actively resist internal causal attributions that place respon-
sibility for workplace inequality onto their own members. While recog-
nizing the historic ambivalence of many feminists to join forces with the
disability rights community, this Part explains how the women don't ask
narrative presents an analogous hurdle to that presented by the medical
model of disability. Part II discusses the potential benefits of borrowing
the social model approach from disability civil rights to reframe the dis-
cussion about women's pay. The social model is best understood as a
theory of causation that identifies employers as one of the multiple nec-
essary causes in workplace inequality, which is a critical move that has
been missing in attempts to combat the gender pay gap.
I. COMMON GROUND: RESISTING INTERNAL CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
Despite facing many similar obstacles and sharing many similar
goals, the women's rights movement generally has been reticent to join
forces with the disability rights movement in their shared quest for
workplace equality.34 This reticence is in part a vestige of the equal
treatment side of the "equal treatment vs. special treatment" debate,
32. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
34. See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis
of the ADA's Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 1, 16 (2012) (explaining that
"feminist legal advocates historically have been hesitant to ally with the disability rights move-
ment").
2014]
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which historically divided the feminist legal community.35 This debate
arose when making difficult strategic decisions about whether women's
workplace equality would be advanced more effectively by highlighting
women's and men's similarities and seeking formal equality, or by ac-
knowledging women's and men's differences and seeking gender-
specific policies or workplace restructuring that takes those differences
into account.36 The equal treatment approach distanced the women's
rights movement from the disability rights movement, which expressly
embraces a difference approach to equality that is now reflected in the
accommodation mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).37
The focus on accommodations for individuals with disabilities lead
many feminists to fear that aligning women with the disabled might
magnify gender stereotypes of women as weak, incapable, and in need of
paternalistic legal protections.38 Although this fear itself reflects disabil-
ity bias and comes with the cost of inhibiting women's access to valuable
workplace accommodations,39 it is also understandable given the "special
treatment stigma" that attaches to marginalized groups that are perceived
to be in need of extra assistance or care.40 This resistance to aligning the
women's movement with the disability rights movement is illustrated by
many feminists' opposition to characterizing pregnancy as a disability.
4'
Even under the recently expanded ADA, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities Commission (EEOC) continues to take the position that pregnan-
35. See id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how this historic "fissure" in
the feminist community has affected contemporary legal advocacy for women's workplace equality).
36. See generally Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).
38. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 17-18, 25-26 (arguing that the backlash against the
ADA raised concerns that linking women's rights to disability rights might evoke the same type of
protectionist and paternalist responses that the women's movement was trying to attack). A similar
dynamic has taken place within the transgender community. See Zach Strassburger, Note, Disability
Law and the Disability Rights Movement for Transpeople, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 337, 349-50
(2012) (explaining how some activists have recognized "that transpeople are hesitant to identify as
disabled because they see disability as a flaw").
39. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 21, 24 (arguing that "[f]eminist disavowal of pregnancy
as a disability has the potential to reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards both disabled people
and women," and that when feminist legal advocates "steer[] clear of disability discourse," they
effectively "engag[e] in the same discriminatory attitudes they have been subjected to").
40. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1108-15 (2014) [hereinafter Por-
ter, Mutual Marginalization]; see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrat-
ed Approach to Solving the Caregiver Conundrum for "Real" Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777,
802-03 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Synergistic Solutions] (describing the "special treatment stigma"
that attaches to accommodation recipients and that is manifested by "both co-employee resentment
as well as employers' reluctance to hire or promote" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 3, 16, 21, 29 (describing the "historical reticence in the
feminist community to advocate for a pregnancy rights framework grounded on the premise that
pregnant women are disabled persons," which has led to a "[fqeminist disavowal of pregnancy as a
disability").
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42
cy is not an impairment for purposes of disability discrimination law,
so many feminists purposely work around that characterization when
seeking to advance pregnant women's rights.43
Now that both movements have achieved some level of success in
combatting stereotypes and employment discrimination in their respec-
tive spheres, however, some scholars and advocates have begun to argue
that the potential benefits of joining forces outweigh the potential risks.
44
This is particularly true in the context of pregnancy, where there is a
move to bring pregnancy under the disability umbrella.45 This shift has
also been fueled by work/family scholars, who recognize that the shared
interest in workplace flexibility is a unifying objective for many individ-
uals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities.46
This increasing willingness of women's advocates and feminist le-
gal scholars to leverage successful aspects of the disability civil rights
movement provides an opportunity to make progress with the seemingly
42. See EEOC, Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 FED. REG. 16,978, 17,007 (March 25, 2011) (revising 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) to reiterate that "conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a phys-
iological disorder are also not impairments").
43. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Robin Devaux, Danielle Fuschetti & Carolyn Salmon, A Sip
of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 97, 110, 114-19 (2013) (accepting that pregnancy itself is not a disability but arguing that "a
broad range of pregnancy-related conditions" are disabilities under the amended ADA); see also
Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 24-25 (explaining "why feminist legal advocates may fear inheriting
ADA backlash if they use the ADA to obtain accommodations for pregnant women").
44. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 35 (urging greater examination of "the intersections of
disability theory and feminist legal theory"). Members of the transgender community have grappled
with a similar question of whether "gender-variant" individuals should or should not seek protection
under disability law. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 338. Advocates recently have been arguing
that the benefits of doing so outweigh the potential risks. See id. at 338-39, 375 (arguing that "both
transsexuals and the existing disability rights movement will benefit from the cooperation" and by
"[florming a strong partnership").
45. See, e.g., Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 443 (2012) (arguing that pregnancy should be deemed a disa-
bility under the ADAAA); see also Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 21, 24 (arguing that "the bifurca-
tion of pregnancy from disability rights discourse ignores critical junctures at which feminist and
disability theories converge, " and urging pregnancy rights advocates to "band with the disability
rights movement to dismantle stereotypes about the able-bodied worker"). A similar movement is
taking place within the transgender community. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 350 (explaining
that "the disability and trans communities have already begun to work together on issues largely
ignored in broader LGB activism, such as gender-neutral public restrooms").
46. See, e.g., Porter, Mutual Marginalization, supra note 40, at 1102 (arguing that the distinc-
tions between caregivers and individuals with disabilities "pale in comparison to the experiences that
these two groups share in common," and arguing to extend the right to reasonable accommodations
to cover caregivers); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans
with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 353 (2009)
(highlighting the potential for coalition-building between work/family advocates and disability rights
advocates); see also Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 621-22 (2004). See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Con-
flict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305,
306-07, 327-28 (2004) (discussing working parents' need for flexibility and accommodation in their
work life); Kelly Timmerman, Note, Accommodating for the Work/Family Conflict: A Proposed
Public Policy Exception, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 283 (2004).
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intractable gender wage gap that still remains robust even fifty years
after Title VII's enactment. Moreover, unlike in the pregnancy and
work/family contexts in which the use of disability theory typically seeks
to advance accommodation rights with all of their attendant "special
treatment" baggage, disability rights theory has the potential to help re-
frame the gender wage debate in ways that may move women forward
even within the confines of a very conventional antidiscrimination
framework. The starting point for such leveraging is identifying a com-
mon source of inequality against which the disability rights movement
has made more headway than have advocates for women's rights. That
common source of inequality is the shared need to resist and unsettle an
internal causal attribution for inequality. For individuals with disabilities,
an internal causal attribution was entrenched within the medicalmodel of
disability, while an internal causal attribution for women implicitly re-
sides in the women don't ask narrative that pervades discussions of the
gender wage gap.
A. The Medical Model of Disability
Although the disability rights movement is a pluralistic endeavor
with diverse participants and goals,47 one objective became both a unify-
ing force and a critical catalyst for achieving legal change for individuals
with disabilities: dismantling the medical model of disability.48 The med-
ical model conceptualized disability as a personal and intrinsic deficit
that needed to be fixed or cured.49 By locating the causal source of disa-
bility within individuals, the medical model made it easy to deflect re-
sponsibility for employment inequality away from employers, and it im-
plicitly blamed individuals with disabilities for their own lack of success
in the workplace.50 Rather than empowering courts, the medical model
bestowed tremendous power upon medical "experts," who were needed
both to identify the deficits and to suggest a treatment or deliver a cure.5'
Over time, it became clear to members of the disability rights movement
that meaningful social and legal progress would not be made without
47. See Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disabil-
ity Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 943 (2012).
48. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 13 (2009).
49. See id. at 18; Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right ": The Entrenchment
of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 185-87 (2008);
Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 266, 268
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010); Travis, supra note 47, at 943.
50. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649-53
(1999) (describing the societal effects of the medical model).
51. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 22 (explaining that the medical model "places disabled
individuals in a unique power dialectic with the medical community, where presenting certain symp-
toms is essential to attain the diagnosis that legitimizes the individual's claim to disability entitle-
ments"); Areheart, supra note 49, at 186 (explaining how the medical model frames social responses
"either as rehabilitation efforts to enable the individual to overcome the effects of the disability, or
medical efforts to find a cure"); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (describing how the medical model
of disability "abdicat[es] ... control to medical professionals").
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first dismantling the medical model of disability and shifting the causal
focus of employment inequality to the workplace structures, practices,
and norms that rendered various physical and mental characteristics lim-
iting in their effects.
B. Gender and the "Women Don't Ask" Narrative
An internal causal attribution for the source of inequality similarly
has entrenched itself in debates about the gender wage gap. In the gender
context, the internal causal attribution resides within the women don't
ask narrative. Like the medical model of disability that locates the cause
of inequality within impaired individuals themselves, the pervasive
women don't ask narrative locates the causal source of the gender pay
gap within women, who purportedly lack the ability or the will to negoti-
ate effectively for wage parity. By implicitly blaming women for their
own income inequality-and linking the source to an internal deficiency
that is assumed to be even more within the victim's control than most
physical or mental impairments-this narrative has been extraordinarily
effective at deflecting employers' responsibility for gender wage inequal-
ity.52 As with the medical model of disability, the internal causal theory
for the gender wage gap implicitly bestows power upon "experts"-in
this context, social psychologists and negotiation skills trainers-who
become necessary to help identify and fix women's deficiencies.
The internal causal narrative is deeply ingrained in public rhetoric,
as women in the workforce are inundated with messaging about the role
that their own behavioral failings play in their unequal pay and career
advancement. Women are told to "lean in," to "pushback," to "stand up,"
to "take charge," to be a "go-getter," to take a "place at the table," and to
just "ask for it."' 53 This narrative gained widespread prominence with the
2003 book by Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever titled Women Don't
Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide.54 The book was reprinted in
2007 under the title, Women Don't Ask: The High Cost of Avoiding Ne-
gotiation-and Positive Strategies for Change.55 Using interviews and
other data from psychology, sociology, and economics, the authors re-
vealed women's lower propensity relative to men to initiate negotiations
52. See Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender Differ-
ence in Salary Negotiation Is Not a "Factor Other Than Sex" Under the Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. I, 9 (2009) ("The more society blames women for their own reluctance to negotiate,
the less culpable employers appear for paying women less than their male counterparts."); Porter,
supra note 25, at 447, 458-60 (analyzing how women are blamed for the gender wage gap by char-
acterizing women's lower pay as a "[c]hoice" and an "unwillingness to negotiate on their own be-
half' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. These phrases all come from popular book titles. See infra notes 54-70.
54. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE (Princeton U. Press) (2003) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T
ASK 1].
55. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION-AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (Random House Publ'g Grp.
2007) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK 1I].
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on their own behalf.56 A year after the reprinted version was published,
the same authors wrote a follow-up book titled, Ask for It: How Women
Can Use the Power of Negotiation to Get What They Really Want.57 This
follow-up book claims to provide "the action plan that women all over
the country requested.,58 According to the book's description on Ama-
zon, this book "teaches [women] how to ask effectively, in ways that feel
comfortable to you as a woman.
59
Although Women Don't Ask provided a catchy phrase for encapsu-
lating the internal causal attribution for the gender wage gap, it was by
no means an isolated work. Another example with a similar (albeit less
catchy) title showed up on the bookstands just after Babcock and
Laschever's first book: Why Women Earn Less: How to Make What
You're Really Worth.60 Women who read the book's description on Am-
azon will likely agree that "[u]nder-eaming is an insidious problem," but
they may be surprised to learn that it is a problem "with psychological
roots that run deep.",61 But the book's description also provides ready (if
demeaning) reassurance, along with an expert plan for women to cure
their ills:
Luckily, there's help. This book is a practical, step-by-step guide for
under-earning women who are ready to turn their lives around. It de-
mystifies the process of under-earning, explores its underlying psy-
chological and emotional issues, and offers practical advice and strat-
egies to help overcome it. Why Women Earn Less explains how you
can be better paid for the work you do. It maps out, on a practical
level, how to overcome the bad habits that contribute to earning less
than you deserve. As you do so, you will find yourself not only bene-
fiting from an improved bottom line, but also enjoying a renewed
sense of optimism and personal satisfaction.
62
On the heels of Women Don't Ask followed a wealth of other self-
help books, all from "experts" who purport to have diagnosed the inter-
nal causes for women's unequal pay and who provide treatment plans for
56. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK 1, supra note 54, at 1-4, 17-129.
57. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT: HOW WOMEN CAN USE THE POWER
OF NEGOTIATION TO GET WHAT THEY REALLY WANT (2008) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER,
ASK FOR IT].
58. See Ask for It: How Women Can Use Negotiation to Get What They Really Want,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Ask-For-lt-Negotiation-Really-ebook/dp/B00I3TTLBQ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT, supra note 57).
59. Id.
60. MIKELANN R. VALTERRA, WHY WOMEN EARN LESS: HOW TO MAKE WHAT YOU'RE
REALLY WORTH (2004).
61. Why Women Earn Less: How to Make What You're Really Worth, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/BO04SPD94C/ref=s9 wish co d99 g351_il (last visited Apr.
5, 2014) (describing VALTERRA, supra note 60).
62. Id.
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women to narrow the gap.63 In Nice Girls Don't Get the Corner Office:
101 Unconscious Mistakes Women Make that Sabotage Their Careers,
women can learn how to fix the "girlish behaviors" that "[s]abotage
[t]heir [c]areers."' In Pushback. How Smart Women Ask-and Stand
Up-for What They Want, a leadership consultant provides women with
the "self-advocacy" tools to get "what is rightlfully yours."65 The authors
of Hardball for Women show women "how to break patterns of behavior
that have put them at a disadvantage in the business world of men.,
66
And for women who still remain uncured, there are many other expert
treatments to try, such as See Jane Lead: 99 Ways for Women to Take
Charge at Work,67 and Her Place at the Table: A Woman's Guide to Ne-
gotiating Five Key Challenges to Leadership Success.68 For women who
care both about the gender wage gap and about their appearance, there is
even a guide for addressing deficits in both arenas simultaneously: The
Go-Getter Girl's Guide: Get What You Want in Work and Life (and Look
Great While You're at It).69
This internal causal narrative reached even loftier heights and great-
er perceived legitimacy when Facebook's Chief Operating Officer, Sher-
yl Sandberg, began promoting her new book, Lean In: Women, Work,
and the Will to Lead.70 Now women's personal deficits have a packaged
sound bite to go with them-the failure to lean in. In two sentences in the
63. See Elzer, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the emergence of books and websites over the
past decade that "teach[] women to be better negotiators," and arguing that they depend upon an
"underlying premise.., that women are not as good at negotiating as men are").
64. Nice Girls Don't Get the Corner Office: 101 Unconscious Mistakes Women Make that
Sabotage Their Careers, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Nice-Girls-Dont-Corner-
Office/dp/0446693316/ref=pd sim b 2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing LOIS P. FRANKEL,
NICE GIRLS DON'T GET THE CORNER OFFICE: 101 UNCONSCIOUS MISTAKES WOMEN MAKE THAT
SABOTAGE THEIR CAREERS (2010)).
65. Pushback: How Smart Women Ask-and Stand Up-for What They Want, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/Pushback-Smart-Women-Ask-Up/dp/1 118104900/ref=pd sim b 13/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing SELENA REZVANI, PUSHBACK: HOW SMART WOMEN ASK-AND
STAND UP-FOR WHAT THEY WANT (2012)).
66. Hardball for Women, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/HardbalI-Women-Revised-Pat-
Heim/dp/0452286417/ref=pdsim b 7 (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing PAT HElM & SUSAN K.
GOLANT, HARDBALL FOR WOMEN (rev'd ed. 2005)).
67. LOIS P. FRANKEL, SEE JANE LEAD: 99 WAYS FOR WOMEN TO TAKE CHARGE AT WORK
(2009).
68. DEBORAH M. KOLB, JUDITH WILLIAMS & CAROL FROHL[NGER, HER PLACE AT THE
TABLE: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING FIVE KEY CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP SUCCESS
(2010); see also DEBORAH M. KOLB & JUDITH WILLIAMS, THE SHADOW NEGOTIATION: HOW
WOMEN CAN MASTER THE HIDDEN AGENDAS THAT DETERMINE BARGAINING SUCCESS (2000); LEE
E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATING: HOW TO
CONVINCE, COLLABORATE, AND CREATE YOUR WAY TO AGREEMENT (2002). A second edition of
the Millers' book was published in 2010 sporting a book cover telling women to "never be taken
advantage of again." See LEE E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATING (2d ed. 2010) (cover photo available at http://www.amazon.com/Womans-
Successfful-Negotiating-Second-Edition/dp/0071746501 ).
69. DEBRA SHIGLEY, THE GO-GETTER GIRL'S GUIDE: GET WHAT YOU WANT IN WORK AND
LIFE (AND LOOK GREAT WHILE YOU'RE AT IT) (2009).
70. SHERYL SANDBERG WITH NELL SCOVELL, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO
LEAD (2013).
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book's introduction, Sandberg acknowledges criticisms about the internal
causal narrative upon which her advice is built: "I know some believe
that by focusing on what women can change themselves-pressing them
to lean in-it seems like I am letting our institutions off the hook," she
notes, "[o]r even worse, they accuse me of blaming the victim. ' '71 But
rather than engaging those critiques, she brushes them aside, saying "I
have heard these criticisms in the past and I know that I will hear
them... in the future., 72 "The time is long overdue," she proceeds un-
daunted, "to encourage more women to dream the possible dream.73 The
dream is "possible," according to Sandberg-despite the fact that the
gender wage gap still exists fifty years after the enactment of Title VII-
because women themselves are a cause of their own workplace inequali-
ty and therefore should be able to implement a cure. "We move closer to
the larger goal of true equality," she proclaims, "with each woman who
,,74leans in.
To Sandberg's credit, she is one of the few self-designated experts
advising women on negotiation skills to acknowledge the flawed as-
sumption that women will narrow the gender pay gap simply by negotiat-
ing to the same degree and in the same manner as men. "[W]e need to
recognize that women often have good cause to be reluctant to advocate
for their own interests," Sandberg wisely cautions, "because doing so can
easily backfire., 75 "For men," she explains, "there is truly no harm in
asking," because society expects men to advocate on their own behalf.
76
"But since women are expected to be concerned with others," Sandberg
explains, "when they advocate for themselves or point to their own val-
ue, both men and women react unfavorably.,77 Sandberg is correct. Re-
search reveals that evaluators resist working with a woman colleague if
they know she has negotiated for higher pay because the mere act of self-
advocacy violates female gender norms, which results in the woman be-
ing perceived as too demanding and less likeable.78
71. Id. at 10-11.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 45. This statement is well supported by social science research. See infra notes 136-
40.
76. SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 45.
77. Id.
78. See Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender Differ-
ences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 84-95 (2007) (describing findings
from a series of empirical studies); Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, When Doesn't It Hurt
Her to Ask? Framing and Justification Reduce the Social Risks of Initiating Compensation Negotia-
tions 2 (Dec. 14, 2008) (unpublished conference paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-l1316162 (noting that "[i]n multiple studies, researchers have found evalua-
tors to be significantly less inclined to work with a woman who attempts to negotiate for higher
compensation as compared to one who does not"); Hannah Riley Bowles & Kathleen L. McGinn,
Untapped Potential in the Study of Negotiation and Gender Inequality in Organizations, 2 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNALS 99, 109 (2008) (summarizing research finding that "participants were significantly
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But despite being aware of this research, Sandberg focuses her p o-
posals neither on the employment decision makers (her peers) who act on
these gender stereotypes, nor on the situational constraints in workplace
negotiations that systematically disadvantage women. Instead she focus-
es on women themselves. Sandberg advises women to adopt a "commu-
nal approach" to their negotiations, which she analogizes to "cross[ing] a
minefield backward in high heels.79 She instructs women to "provide a
legitimate explanation for the negotiation," to "invok[e] common inter-
ests, emphasiz[e] larger goals, and [to] approach[] the negotiation as
solving a problem as opposed to taking a critical stance."80 For this to be
effective, Sandberg advises, women must "combine niceness with insist-
ence" and be sure to "smil[e] frequently," while "expressing appreciation
and concern." 81
When a woman executive as successful as Sheryl Sandberg-who
has access to such a powerful platform upon which to engage the public
about issues of gender inequality in pay and career advancement-
nevertheless uses that platform to advise women to "smil[e] frequent-
ly," 82 it demonstrates the depths to which the internal causal narrative has
been absorbed and accepted in our society. This is not to say that Sand-
berg is providing erroneous advice. In fact, it is well-founded in the psy-
chological literature.83 But the fact that researchers have been able to
identify and document the situational constraints and the invidious gen-
der stereotypes that affect employment decision makers' reactions to
women in the workplace renders even less defensible the continued un-
willingness to confront the institutional discrimination that underlies the
gender wage gap.
84
less inclined to work with a woman who had attempted to negotiate as compared to one who had
stayed mum, and male participants consistently penalized women more than men for attempting to
negotiate"); see also Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1060 (explaining that "even when [women] do
stand up for themselves, they may be penalized for it").
79. SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 47-48.
80. Id.
81. Id at 48.
82. Id.
83. See Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, How Can Women Escape the Compensation
Negotiation Dilemma? Relational Accounts Are One Answer, 37 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 80, 91
(2012) [hereinafter Bowles & Babcock, How Can Women Escape] (concluding from two empirical
studies "that female negotiators can reduce social resistance to their self-advocacy and improve their
negotiation outcomes if they legitimize their requests in a manner that also communicates their
concern for organizational relationships"); Bowles & Babcock, When Doesn't It Hurt Her to Ask?,
supra note 78 (manuscript at 1) (finding in a series of empirical studies that women may reduce the
social risks of initiating negotiations for higher pay by "using a communal frame to communicate
concern for relationships" or "justifying the request with external validation," such as an external job
offer).
84. If Sandberg had framed her advice differently, the immediate value that it may provide to
women who are poised near the top of professional careers (and who therefore cannot wait for struc-
tural or legal reforms) might have outweighed the downside of publicly reinforcing the internal
causal narrative of women's workplace inequality. Rather than suggesting that her book is a new
"feminist manifesto," see SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 9, she could have explicitly recognized the
necessary role that employers play in sustaining women's inequality and the illegitimacy of placing
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While the pervasiveness of the internal causal narrative in our socie-
ty is pernicious enough on its own, even more disappointing is the way in
which Title VII has invited this narrative into legal doctrine. In doing so,
Title VII reinforces rather than disrupts this powerful source of pay ine-
quality. Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating on the
basis of sex, race, color, religion or national origin in hiring, firing, com-
pensation, or other "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
85
However, § 703(h) of Title VII-known as "the Bennett Amendment"-
carves out an exception that applies only to claims of compensation dis-
crimination and only to the protected status of sex, thereby providing less
legal protection only for sex-based discrimination in pay.86
The Bennett Amendment states that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice ... for any employer to differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation
paid... if such differentiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act]. 87
The Equal Pay Act (EPA), enacted prior to Title VII, prohibits employers
that are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act from paying women
less than men for "equal work" on jobs requiring "equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions."88 The EPA contains four exceptions for pay differentials that are
based on: (1) "a seniority system"; (2) "a merit system"; (3) "a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production"; or (4)
"any other factor other than sex."89 The Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rates these four defenses to gender-based compensation discrimination
claims from the EPA into Title VII, which means that an employer will
not violate Title VII by discriminating against women in their pay if the
causal responsibility on women, but then described her advice as an interim step that might provide
some immediate assistance for those women in privileged situations that enable them to "lean in,"
while continuing to pursue the more important and longer-term task of changing the organizational
norms that disadvantage women. For a similar book that successfully achieves this constructive
balance, see JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR
PATTERNS WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNOW (2014).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
86. Id. § 2000e-2(h). Congress also grants differential protection levels against intentional
discrimination by not subjecting race and color to the bona fide occupational qualification defense to
disparate treatment claims, see id § 2000e-2(e)(l), and by granting a modest accommodation right
for religion, see id. § 2000e(j).
87. Id. § 2000e-2(h). The legislative history of the Bennett Amendment is very limited. See
Pamela L. Perry, Let Them Become Professionals: An Analysis of the Failure to Enforce Title Vii's
Pay Equity Mandate, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 160 & n.140, 161 (1991) (summarizing the
Bennett Amendment's legislative history). The protected status of sex was not added to Title VII
until two days before the House vote, and it was not until the House version was on the Senate floor
for final consideration that Senator Bennett offered his Amendment as a concern arose over possible
inconsistencies between Title VII and the EPA. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171-
73 (1981); 110 CONG. REC. 13310, 13647 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
89. Id.
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pay differences are based on seniority, merit, or production systems, or
on "any other factor other than sex.
9 °
Sex-based compensation discrimination claims are still cognizable
under Title VII, which theoretically remains broader than the EPA be-
cause it does not limit antidiscrimination protection only to situations in
which lower paid women are performing substantially similar work as
higher paid men.9' But the "any other factor other than sex" defense has
dramatically undercut the efficacy of Title VII's protection against sex-
based pay discrimination by opening the door to internal causal narra-
tives that shield the gender pay gap from legal review. This is particular-
ly true in the context of disparate impact claims, which otherwise would
have the most potential for redressing employer pay practices that base
92compensation in full or in part on individual employee negotiations.
A Title VII disparate impact claim requires proof that a facially neu-
tral particular employment practice causes women to experience substan-
tially different outcomes than men.93 The employer must then defend the
practice by demonstrating that it is "job related" and "consistent with
business necessity."94 If the employer meets that burden, the plaintiff
may still succeed by showing that a less discriminatory alternative em-
ployment practice exists that serves the employer's business needs.95 If a
plaintiff succeeds in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may receive
back pay but is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages, or to a
jury trial.96 The power of a disparate impact claim is that it enables a
97court to enjoin the illegal employment practice. In a pay equity case, a
court could force an employer to eliminate the challenged wage-setting
90. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-80; see also Charles B. Craver, If Women Don't Ask: Impli-
cations for Bargaining Encounters, the Equal Pay Act, and Title VII, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1104,
1118-22 (2004) (describing how the Bennett Amendment affects Title VII claims); Porter, Synergis-
tic Solutions, supra note 40, at 830-31 (same).
91. See Craver, supra note 90, at 1118; see also Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Var-
tanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 180
(2011) (noting that unlike the EPA, "Title VII extends to pay discrimination involving dissimilar
jobs").
92. See Perry, supra note 87, at 159 (describing how "the Bennett Amendment has proven to
be a barrier to many sex-based wage discrimination cases that rely on the disparate impact doctrine
of Title VII").
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
94. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1 )(A)(i).
95. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(l)(C).
96. See id. § 1981(b).
97. See id. § 2002e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (hold-
ing that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude [members of a protected class]
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited"); see also Travis, supra
note 21, at 373-74 (describing the remedy for a disparate impact claim); Stewart J. Schwab & Ste-
ven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1197, 1238 (2003) (explaining that "[t]he standard judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact
case requires the employer to change the policy or standard for everybody").
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practice and require the employer to set up an alternative method for
establishing employees' pay.98
Unfortunately, courts have been very willing to allow employers to
use the factor other than sex defense as a way to sidestep disparate im-
pact law by shifting causal attention away from the employer's role in
wage setting and onto other causal sources.99 The Bennett Amendment's
incorporation of the factor other than sex defense allows the law to ig-
nore one of the necessary causes, i.e., the employer, in what is really a
multiple-necessary-cause scenario. Employers have used this strategy
effectively with external causal narratives that invoke a variety of mar-
ket-related excuses for gender pay disparities, as well as with internal
causal narratives that invoke women's own "choices" as the cause of
their own pay inequality.10 0
As the women don't ask narrative gained prominence socially, em-
ployers also have seized upon this specific version of an internal causal
narrative to continue shielding themselves from legal liability for sex-
based pay discrimination claims. Many courts have rejected gender pay
equity claims by accepting an employer's argument that women's failure
to negotiate as successfully as men supports the factor other than sex
defense.'0' Even the EEOC has bought into this causal narrative, as illus-
trated in its compliance manual that lists examples of gender wage dis-
parities that it would not consider to be violations of the EPA."2 One
listed example is when an employer gave "the same opening offer" to
both a male and female employee, but the female employee "ended up
with a lower starting salary" because she "did not bargain as assertively
as the male."'1 3 Not only does the term "assertively" itself reflect gender
stereotypes, but the EEOC also ignores social science research demon-
strating that a woman who negotiates in the same manner as a man is
likely to be penalized for her efforts, both by obtaining less favorable
98. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 611 (describing a disparate impact remedy in the
pay equity context).
99. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348 (explaining how employers "falsely dichotomiz[e]" the
causes of women's workplace inequality and use causes outside the workplace to skirt the applica-
tion of Title VII law); Travis, supra note 8, at 54 (observing that "courts often implicitly decide
whether to view the employee or the employer as the 'cause' of the employment event at issue").
100. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348-49 (compiling case law allowing employers to use a
"market," "choice," or "lack of interest" defense to Title VII disparate impact claims (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
101. Elzer, supra note 52, at 10-21 (summarizing case law and finding that, "[a]lmost without
exception, courts hold that salary negotiation is a valid 'factor other than sex' that justifies an em-
ployer paying a man more than a woman who performs substantially equal work"); see Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 807-23 (analyzing employers' legal success in justifying gender pay
differentials on the basis of "market forces," including "individual pay demands" and "bargaining
effectiveness"); Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1047 (explaining how courts are "reluctant to hold
employers liable for discrimination that results, in part, from ... the socialization of women ... to
negotiate less aggressively").
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results in the wage negotiation and by suffering residual dislike by other
workers who then perceive her as overly aggressive.104
While most of these claims have been formally styled as alleged
EPA violations,10 5 the Bennett Amendment incorporates this causal bar-
rier into Title VII. Even though an employer's selection of a pay-setting
practice that relies upon individual employee negotiation is, by defini-
tion, another necessary cause of the gender pay disparity, the Bennett
Amendment effectively allows that practice to avoid scrutiny by block-
ing the claim before getting to the business necessity defense, which
would require an employer to justify its practice.106 This risk of undercut-
ting Title VIi's ability to address facially neutral but discriminatory pay
practices through a broad application of the factor other than sex defense
has been compounded by Supreme Court dicta suggesting that the Ben-
nett Amendment may bar the use of the disparate impact theory altogeth-
er in the context of sex-based pay equity claims.0 7 This dicta suggests
that the legal gap is even wider between the protection that is provided
for women's pay disparities and all other forms of status-based employ-
ment discrimination.
The women don't ask narrative has become so accepted that even
legislators who have recognized the inadequacy of our existing legal
tools for combatting the gender pay gap are willing to reinforce it and
lend it credibility. The internal causal attribution has found its way into
104. See supra note 78 and infra notes 136-40.
105. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 174-75, 178-79 (summarizing cases in which
employers successfully defended EPA claims by using the excuse that "the male has negotiated for
more pay").
106. See Rabin-Margalioth, supro note 24, at 812 & n.24 (analyzing how employers have
successfully argued under existing law "that there is no legal obligation to offer individual workers
more than their initial pay demands, even if implementation of a wage scheme based on employee
wage demands ultimately disadvantages women").
107. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (plurality
opinion). In reaching that holding, the Court stated that "if Congress intended to prohibit all dispar-
ate-impact claims, it certainly could have done so," and it then used the EPA as an example. Id. at
239 n. I. "For instance, in the Equal Pay Act," noted the Court, "Congress barred recovery if a pay
differential was based 'on any other factor'-reasonable or unreasonable-'other than sex."' Id
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012)). Many commentators have read this dicta as a potential bar
on disparate impact claims for sex-based pay equity under Title VII, which incorporates the "any
other factor other than sex" defense from the EPA. See, e.g., William E. Doyle Jr., Implications of
Smith v. City of Jackson on Equal Pay Act Claims and Sex-Based Pay Discrimination Claims under
Title VII, 21 LAB. LAW. 183, 183-85, 188-90 (2005) (arguing that the "implication" from the Smith
dicta "is that the disparate impact theory is ruled out as a basis for sex-based pay discrimination
claims under Title VII"); Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 40, at 831 (explaining that Su-
preme Court dicta has made it "unclear" whether disparate impact claims for sex-based wage dis-
crimination are cognizable); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 24, at 828 (describing the dicta in Smith
as "a strong suggestion ... that the EPA's fourth affirmative defense effectively rules out disparate
impact" claims under Title VII). But see Perry, supra note 87, at 158-74 (arguing that courts have
incorrectly interpreted the Bennett Amendment to constrain Title VII disparate impact claims); Mark
B. Seidenfeld, Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doc-
trine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1088-95 (1982) (arguing that the Bennett Amendment should not
preclude Title VII disparate impact claims for sex-based wage discrimination).
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the text of one of the most progressive pieces of proposed legislation that
is backed by some of the most progressive women in Congress: the
Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA).'°8 The PFA's goal is "to provide more
effective remedies to victims of discrimination in the payment of wages
on the basis of sex."10 9 The bill recognizes the importance of eliminating
the gender pay gap not only to "reduc[e] the number of working women
earning unfairly low wages," but also to enhance "women's retirement
security," to "reduc[e] the dependence on public assistance," and to
"promot[e] stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair
rate of pay." 10 To achieve these goals, the bill seeks to expand the
EPA's impact by narrowing the factor other than sex defense to apply
only to "a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or
experience.""' The PFA also would require an employer to demonstrate
that the factor is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and it
would give employees the opportunity to demonstrate "that an alternative
employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose
without producing such differential."
'"1 2
If the bill stopped there, it could indeed go a significant distance
toward restoring disparate impact claims in the context of gender-based
compensation."3 But the PFA includes an additional provision that im-
plicitly endorses and entrenches the internal causal narrative that the bill
is designed to dismantle. Section 5 of the PFA is titled, "Negotiation
Skills Training for Girls and Women."'" 14 This section would authorize
the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Secretary of Education,
to establish a competitive grant program for selected public agencies,
private nonprofits, and community-based organizations to "carry out an
effective negotiation skills training program that empowers girls and
women."" 5 According to the Act, funded programs would "help girls and
women strengthen their negotiation skills to allow the girls and women
108. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1l3/s84. A version of The Paycheck Fairness Act was first
introduced by then-Senator Hillary Clinton and Representative Rosa DeLauro in 2005. See Paycheck
Fairness Act, S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005). The most recent version was sponsored by Senator Barba-
ra Mikulski, along with cosponsors Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, among other
prominent women democrats. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84.
109. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84.
110. Id. § 2(3)(B), (4)(C)(ii)-(iii).
I1l. Id. § 3(a)(2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. § 3(a)(3). The Paycheck Fairness Act would also prohibit employers from retaliating
against employees for discussing wages with co-workers, id § 3(b), would increase penalties, in-
cluding compensatory and punitive damage awards, id. § 3(c), and would allow class actions, id.
§ 3(c)(4).
113. See Elzer, supra note 52, at 30-33 (analyzing the potential effect of the Paycheck Fairness
Act on claims targeting negotiation); see also Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 195-202 (ana-
lyzing how the PFA would affect EPA cases in which an employer invokes a market excuse to
justify a gender pay disparity).
114. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84 § 5.
115. Id. § 5(a).
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to obtain higher salaries and rates of compensation that are equal to those
paid to similarly situated male employees."
'" 6
While empowering girls and women is certainly a laudable goal and
one that is difficult to criticize in the abstract, this particular form of
"empowerment" rests on the assumptions that women's negotiation skills
are deficient, that experts can treat the deficiency, and that women them-
selves are responsible for moving their wages to an "equal" level with
similarly situated men. Moreover, the PFA's validation of the relevance
of gender-based negotiation skills may enable employers to successfully
invoke differences in negotiation outcomes as a "bona fide factor other
than sex,"'1 17 which would undermine the PFA's attempt to narrow that
broad-based efense in the first place."
8
The PFA highlights how little progress the women's rights move-
ment has made in resisting the internal causal attribution that places re-
sponsibility for the gender pay gap within women themselves. The disa-
bility rights movement, in contrast, has made tremendous strides in dis-
mantling the internal causal attribution narrative that historically pre-
vented its members from holding employers responsible for the work-
place inequality faced by individuals with disabilities. That success was
achieved by replacing the medical model of disability with the social
model of disability, which shifted the causal focus from individuals onto
employers-a shift that is also needed in the context of the gender pay
gap.
II. LEARNING FROM THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: USING THE
SOCIAL MODEL TO SHIFT CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOYERS
The social model of disability provides a theory that might help
overcome the common barrier that women who experience wage ine-
quality share with individuals with disabilities. This model recognizes
the socially constructed nature of a marginalized and therefore limiting
116. Id. § 5(a)(5).
117. Id. § 3(a)(2) (internal quotation mark omitted).
118. But see Elzer, supra note 52, at 33 (suggesting that the presence of the negotiation funding
provision would improve plaintiffs' chances for success in an EPA claim challenging unequal pay
resulting from individual negotiations because "courts would be more likely to account for [gender
differences in negotiation] if a statute authorized government-funded negotiation training programs
designed for the express purpose of teaching women and girls how to obtain higher salaries"). The
PFA also includes a brief provision stating that the EEOC "shall provide training to ... affected
individuals and entities on matters involving discrimination in the payment of wages," Paycheck
Fairness Act, S. 84 § 4, and a longer provision on "Research, Education, and Outreach," which
would require the Secretary of Labor to "conduct studies and provide information to employers,
labor organizations, and the general public concerning the means available to eliminate pay dispari-
ties between men and women," id. § 6. While these provisions are on the right track in attempting to
combat the institutional sources of the gender wage gap, neither provision contains details about
what such training, studies, and information would contain, nor does it identify any of the known
sources of the gender wage disparity, including employers' stereotypic reliance upon and reactions
to individual employee negotiations. It leaves open the possibility that employers will simply be
educated about women's own deficient negotiation skills as a source of the gender pay gap.
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status, and it uses that recognition as a tool to shift causal attributions
both in society and in the law.
A. The Social Model of Disability
Members of the disability civil rights movement recognized that re-
ducing stigma and achieving meaningful antidiscrimination protection
would first require combatting the internal causal attribution that was
entrenched in the medical model of disability. "9 The movement therefore
unified around a central goal of reconceptualizing disability not as an
inherently limiting individual trait but rather as a social construct created
by the interaction between mental or physical characteristics and contin-
gent aspects of our environment that impose restrictions.'20
Under the social model, the term "impairment" is used solely to de-
scribe a mental or physical condition, which is not inherently limiting
independent from the context and environment in which it interacts.121 A
"disability," in contrast, refers not to an internal attribute, but instead to
the limitations that are socially "imposed on top of one's impairment."'
' 22
The social model is thus best understood not as a normative stance or
123policy prescription, but rather as a causal attribution theory. It provides
a theoretical basis for shifting from an internal to an external causal at-
tribution to explain the source of inequality for individuals with impair-
ments.124 The crowning achievement of the social model of disability
was to shift causal responsibility for workplace inequality away from
individuals' physical and mental impairments and onto the "architectural,
social, and economic environment" that renders those impairments limit-
ing. 1
25
119. See Travis, supra note 47, at 943; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 48, at 13 (describing
"the endorsement of a social rather than a medical model of disability" as "the one position that
approaches consensus within the movement").
120. See Travis, supra note 47, at 943; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 48, at 18 (describing
the social model of disability); Crossley, supra note 50, at 653-55 (explaining that "the social model
of disability sees disadvantages as flowing from social systems and structures"); Chai R. Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What
Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2000) (describing the social mod-
el's understanding that "actual limitations that flow from an individual's physical or mental impair-
ment often result from the manner in which society itself is structured"); Shakespeare, supra note 49,
at 268 (explaining that the social model views disability as "a relationship between people with
impairment and a disabling society").
121. See Shakespeare, supra note 49, at 268; Travis, supra note 47, at 944; Shelley Tremain,
On the Government of Disability, 27 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 617, 620 (2001).
122. Tremain, supra note 121, at 620; Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (describing the social
model's distinction between impairment and disability).
123. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251, 1251, 1255 (2007); see also Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (describing the social model as a
causal theory).
124. See Samaha, supra note 123, at 1255; Travis, supra note 47, at 944.
125. Samaha, supra note 123, at 1255; Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The social model not only unified very diverse members of the dis-
ability rights movement, but it also provided the foundation for legal and
policy change. The most significant result was congressional enactment
of the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate.126 The accommoda-
tion mandate recognizes that both an individual's impairment and aspects
of the workplace are multiple necessary causes of an individual's inabil-
ity to perform essential job tasks. The accommodation mandate therefore
obligates employers to make reasonable modifications to workplace
practices, policies, structures, and norms in order to reduce the functional
effects of impairments that otherwise are not inherently limiting. By ren-
dering legally irrelevant the particular diagnosis, the specific source, or
the potential treatments for an individual's impairment, the ADA also
shifted power away from medical experts.1
27
The social model of disability has not achieved all of the goals of
the disability rights movement, nor is it without shortcomings.28 But it
has achieved far more progress than the women's rights movement has
achieved in delegitimizing the internal causal narrative for the gender
pay gap and resting power away from negotiation "experts" who are be-
ing increasingly empowered to diagnose and cure women's deficiencies.
Social model theorists did not undertake this momentous shift all on
their own. To the contrary, early social modelists actually borrowed from
and leveraged certain aspects of feminist legal theory-in particular,
theories about the socially constructed nature of gender-in order to de-
velop and ground the social model of disability.129 As Professor Carlos
Ball has explained, it was feminist theory that led disability rights advo-
cates "to grapple with the social contexts that often determine whether
particular physical or mental impairments translate into disabilities.'
' 30
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).
127. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 364 (explaining that "[i]n the social model of disabil-
ity, doctors are no longer the center of the story"); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (describing one
goal of the social model of disability as trying to delegitimize "the medical model's abdication of
control to medical professionals"). This shift was strengthened in the Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act of 2008, which clarified that one's disability status is assessed in an unmiti-
gated state, rendering irrelevant the potential medical treatments that are available to ameliorate an
impairment. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
128. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 49, at 192-225 (explaining the ways in which "the medical
model remains firmly entrenched" in social and legal context, despite the movement's focus on the
social model of disability); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (explaining that one shortcoming of the
social model of disability is that it left the definition of impairment in the hands of medical profes-
sionals, "which is precisely what the social model of disability had intended to undermine by replac-
ing the medical model").
129. See, e.g., Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 22 (describing the work by early social model
theorist Susan Wendell); see also Carlos A. Ball, Lookingfor Theory in All the Right Places: Femi-
nist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 141-42
(2005) (explaining how disability discrimination law is built upon "the feminist position on differ-
ence and equality," and arguing that "[w]hat disability discrimination law demands is something
much closer to the understanding of equality held by feminist theory, one sensitive and attuned to
issues of difference").
130. Ball, supra note 129, at 134-35.
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Such borrowing, however, has generally occurred in the direction of dis-
ability rights advocates seeking to align with gender theory, rather than
the reverse.' At this important juncture fifty years after the enactment
of Title VII, it is time for women's advocates to claim the social model
as a tool with untapped potential for combatting the gender pay gap. 32
B. A Social Model of the Gender Pay Gap
The women don't ask narrative is analogous to the medical model
of disability in that it focuses on perceived deficiencies within the indi-
viduals who are experiencing workplace inequality, and it therefore looks
to experts to provide a treatment or cure. In the disability context, the
medical model viewed impairments as deficits and sought help from
medical professionals, while in the gender context, the women don't ask
narrative views women's approach to negotiation as a deficit and seeks
help from psychologists and negotiation experts. Applying a social mod-
el to the gender pay gap would make explicit the fact that gender pay
disparities are actually the result of the interaction between the way in
which women negotiate and the environment in which that negotiation
occurs. A social model would recognize that the use of an employment
practice that sets wages based in whole or in part on individual bargain-
ing without pay transparency is what renders "disabling" any unique
aspects of women's negotiation style.
One critical result of the social model of disability was to reveal that
physical and mental impairments are merely differences that are not in-
herently limiting outside of the context in which they interact. Applying
a social model to the gender pay gap would similarly provide a way to
push women's negotiation differences from the normative realm into the
merely descriptive. A social model reveals that any unique aspects of
women's approach to negotiation are not necessarily deficits outside of
an environment that renders them limiting in obtaining equal pay. In oth-
er words, a social model prevents observers from ignoring context. It
recognizes when a multiple-necessary-cause scenario exists, and it forces
attention onto the situational cause that is otherwise overshadowed by the
personal. Specifically, it focuses attention onto the aspects of an employ-
er's compensation system that are necessary to produce the gender pay
131. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 30 (observing that the recent move to characterize
pregnancy as a disability has been launched by disability scholars, "rather than from an advocate
focusing primarily on pregnancy rights"). A notable exception is scholars who have used the ADA's
accommodation mandate to provide comparators for supporting broader accommodation rights under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in
the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 27-38 (1995); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Inter-
action of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1004-11, 1018-35 (2013).
132. Cf Strassburger, supra note 38, at 338-39 (arguing that "transgender, transsexual, and
otherwise gender-variant or genderqueer activists can benefit from gender identity protections in-
formed by the social model of disability" because the social model provides "a stronger long-term
theoretical construct" than those offered by sex discrimination law (footnote omitted)).
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gap. In doing so, the social model would shift power away from "ex-
perts" who, under the current internal causal narrative, are needed to
diagnose and treat women's negotiation deficiencies, which is a process
that itself carries economic and psychological costs.
33
Just as the social model of disability does not deny that physical and
mental impairments exist, a social model of the gender pay gap does not
need to reject the existence of general differences in the ways that wom-
en as a group and men as a group approach wage negotiations on their
own behalf. The authors of Women Don 't Ask persuasively demonstrate,
for example, that women negotiate their starting salaries and ask for rais-
es less frequently than men,'34 and a body of research supports that con-
clusion. 35 The social model merely reveals that those differences are
only deficits because of the employment practices that render them so-
in other words, the differences may be socially real but legally irrelevant.
The empirical research on the gender pay gap not only supports the
social model's notion that limitations are produced by the interaction
between internal differences and the social environment in which the
different individuals are engaged, but it also reveals that this interaction
is neither random nor neutral. To the contrary, this interaction is highly
dependent upon gender stereotypes and bias.'36 The research demon-
strates, for example, that employers react more negatively to and take
tougher positions against women who attempt to negotiate their wages
than employers do for men who engage in the same type of self-
advocacy.'37 In addition, evaluators-both men and women-tend to
133. Cf id. at 364 (arguing that the disability rights movement's shift "from a medical model
of disability to a social model" can benefit other marginalized groups, like members of the trans
community, to "avoid the economic and psychological costs" of using medical diagnoses "to secure
protections").
134. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK I, supra note 54, at 1-4, 17- 129.
135. See Bowles & McGinn, supra note 78, at 105-06 (summarizing research findings "sug-
gest[ing] that male managers and professionals negotiate higher starting pay than their female
peers"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 3-9, 34 (summarizing the social science research on gender differ-
ences in negotiation approaches and results, and concluding "that gender differences in negotiation
are real"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 184-92 (summarizing research documenting wom-
en's differential propensity to negotiate for higher compensation than men); Rabin-Margalioth,
supra note 24, at 814-18 (summarizing research demonstrating that women as a group assess the
economic value of their work lower than men do when pay-rate information is unavailable, and that
there are "systemic differences in the way women and men approach and handle wage negotiation");
Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1059-60 (summarizing research on the differential negotiation
patterns of women and men and how that contributes to the gender pay gap). See generally Charles
B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 299 (1999) (describing differences in women's and men's negotiation styles).
136. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 164 (explaining that "when women do negoti-
ate, gender schemas can and do influence the way employers react").
137. See Bowles & McGinn, supra note 78, at 108-09 (summarizing studies finding that wom-
en will achieve less successful pay negotiation results than men when they "take a stereotypically
masculine approach and advocate assertively for their self-interest"); see also BABCOCK &
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK I, supra note 54, at 87 (explaining that "an assertive woman, no
matter how well she presents her arguments in a negotiation, risks decreasing her likeability and
therefore her ability to influence the other side"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 2, 6-8 (summarizing
research demonstrating that "employers may react more negatively to women who do attempt to
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further penalize women for attempting to negotiate for higher pay by
deeming them less likeable and overly aggressive, and therefore being
less willing to work with them in the future.'38 Women's tendency not to
negotiate for higher wages is thus a "rational decision" that correctly
takes into account the fact that society "punish[es] women for being ag-
gressive."139 Gender differences in negotiation cannot meaningfully be
extricated from social context-"namely that men and women 'face dif-
ferent social incentives' when deciding whether to initiate negotia-
tion."' 14 In other words, internal differences in women's and men's ap-
proaches to negotiation are caused in part by external realities of the
workplace.
Social scientists have recognized the implications that this research
has for crafting solutions and legal reforms. Because the research
demonstrates that the differences in women's negotiation tendencies and
results are contingent upon the gender-biased environment in which the
negotiation takes place, social scientists have argued that we "should
shift the discussion of prescriptive implications away from fixing the
women to addressing the social conditions that motivate these gender
differences."'141 The social model used in the disability context would
provide a theoretical framework to help scaffold those views as advo-
cates try to combat the causal narrative not just socially but doctrinally as
well.
While the disability rights movement ultimately leveraged the social
model of disability into the reasonable accommodation mandate in disa-
bility discrimination law, the women's rights movement has significant
room to progress without yet needing to go that far. Applying the social
model to the gender wage gap could provide the basis for the more mod-
est step of jettisoning the Bennett Amendment and resuscitating the dis-
negotiate than they do to similarly-situated men"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 184-95
(summarizing research showing that employers "react less favorably to" and "take a much tougher
stance against female employees who negotiate on their own behalf').
138. See supra notes 135-37; see also Elzer, supra note 52, at 7-9 (summarizing research
showing that "employers sometimes react more negatively toward women who negotiate than they
do towards male negotiators"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 194 (concluding that "[s]elf-
promotion is so important for negotiating on one's own behalf and yet women are penalized for such
self-promotion").
139. Elzer, supra note 52, at 9.
140. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Bowles, Babcock & Lai, supra note 78, at 100); see also Bowles &
Babcock, How Can Women Escape, supra note 83, at 80-81 (summarizing research showing "that
women have good reason to be more reticent than men about negotiating for higher compensation
because women pay a higher social cost than men for doing so"). See generally Mary E. Wade,
Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 65 (2001)
(describing the social and psychological costs that women pay for self-advocacy).
141. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, supra note 78, at 100; see also Iris Bohnet & Hannah Riley
Bowles, Special Section: Gender in Negotiation: Introduction, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 390 (2008)
(explaining that "what recent research has shown is that gender effects on negotiation are contingent
on situational factors"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 9 (arguing that the "shift in focus from internal
motivations to external factors" to explain why women negotiate less successfully makes it harder
for employers to "escape liability by claiming that their male employees are better negotiators").
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parate impact doctrine in the context of sex-based wage discrimination
claims. 142
The social model is entirely consistent with conventional disparate
impact doctrine. Disparate impact law always deals with situations in-
volving a facially neutral employment practice, which interacts with
some real difference that distinguishes the members of a protected group
from others, thereby producing disproportionate results. All disparate
impact claims involve multiple necessary causes-one cause being the
employer's practice and another being something that differentiates the
protected class members from others.43 An employer's neutral practice
could not disparately impact a particular group if the members of that
group did not differ from the members of another group in some mean-
ingful way.44 Yet disparate impact doctrine does not care whether those
distinguishing characteristics are "physical, social, or cultural in na-
ture."'145 In fact, disparate impact doctrine deems those distinguishing
characteristics irrelevant in assessing an employer's liability. 146 Disparate
impact doctrine "treats the employer's criterion as the cause of a dispari-
ty," even though it is only one of the necessary factors for producing the
outcome.47 The defining feature of disparate impact doctrine-what
makes this model "a distinct and powerful feature on the antidiscrimina-
tion landscape"-is its refusal to ignore the employer's causal role just
because there is some feature about the members of a protected group
that is also necessary to produce the disparate results.48 Professors Ra-
mona Paetzold and Steven Willbom describe this defining feature of
disparate impact theory as "causation with blinders.' 49
This multi-causal reality has not created a stumbling block for
courts in disparate impact claims based on statuses other than sex and in
contexts other than compensation.50 The Supreme Court's decision in
142. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 600, 606 (urging the need "to revive disparate
impact theory for use in pay equity disputes"); Perry, supra note 87, at 137 (arguing that "[t]he
judiciary's refusal to enforce pay equity as mandated by Title VIl's disparate impact theory must be
challenged"); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 24, at 818 (arguing that an employer's use of individual
negotiations to set salaries adversely affects women and should support a disparate impact claim).
143. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View
of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 353 (1996) ("[E]very disparate impact case
depends on an adverse impact that is created jointly by social factors and the employer's employ-
ment practice."); Travis, supra note 21, at 349-50 (noting the multi-causal nature of all disparate
impact claims).
144. See Travis, supra note 21, at 349-50.
145. See id
146. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 143, at 354 (explaining that disparate impact doc-
trine "ignore[s] causes external to the employer that contribute to the impact," which means that
"employers may be held legally responsible for impacts that are 'caused' in substantial part by
factors external to the employers").
147. Id. at 353-54, 364 (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 364.
149. Id. at 353-54, 364.
150. See Travis, supra note 21, at 350.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,15' in which the Court first recognized the
disparate impact theory under Title VII, is a prototypic example. 52 In
Griggs, the Court used the disparate impact doctrine to invalidate an em-
ployer's facially neutral practice of requiring applicants to have a high
school diploma, which at the time excluded African-American applicants
at a higher rate than white applicants.153 The fact that the disproportion-
ate results resulted both from the employer's hiring practice and from the
social reality that a lower percentage of African-Americans than whites
received high school diplomas did not prevent the Court from invalidat-
ing the hiring practice under the disparate impact doctrine. The em-
ployer was not permitted to point to African-Americans' lesser success in
completing high school as a way to shield itself from liability for its neu-
tral hiring practice, which it could not lawfully retain unless it could
demonstrate that it was job-related and consistent with business necessi-
ty.
55
Yet that is precisely what the Bennett Amendment permits employ-
ers to do in the context of gender pay equity claims. By incorporating the
EPA's factor other than sex defense into Title VII, the Bennett Amend-
ment reverses the typical causation blinders in a disparate impact claim
involving sex-based pay disparities. The factor other than sex defense not
only allows contributing factors that reside outside the employer to be-
come legally relevant, but it treats those factors as the cause of the gen-
der wage inequity. The Bennett Amendment permits employers to point
to women's lesser success in negotiation as a way to shield the employer
from liability for its facially neutral hiring practice that bases compensa-
tion on individual negotiation without pay transparency, thereby allow-
ing the employer's wage-setting practice to avoid scrutiny for business
necessity because the case never gets to the defense stage.'56 There is no
151. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
152. Id. at 431; see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 143, at 352-53 (using Griggs to illustrate
"the multiple causation present in all disparate impact cases"); Travis, supra note 21, at 350 (analyz-
ing the multiple necessary causes in the Griggs case).
153. 401 U.S. at 436.
154. Id.; see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 143, at 352-53 (explaining that the disparate
impact in Griggs was "caused" both by "the social conditions that resulted in a lower proportion of
blacks than whites with high school diplomas" and the employer's use of a high school diploma
requirement to make hiring decisions (internal quotation marks omitted)); Travis, supra note 21, at
350 (describing the multiple causes of the disparate impact in Griggs).
155. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 143, at 393 (explaining that evidence of "causative
factors" that have their source within the employees who are experiencing disproportionately nega-
tive employment outcomes are irrelevant in a disparate impact case).
156. Cf Perry, supra note 87, at 128, 131, 136-37 (arguing that disparate impact doctrine
should require courts to examine the business justification of any type of "pay-setting practice[]" that
is "consequentially preferential to men"). Even if an employer could overcome the business necessi-
ty hurdle, women could still win a disparate impact claim by demonstrating a less discriminatory
alternative pay-setting practice. Social science research could aid that endeavor by suggesting specif-
ic situational changes that reduce the potential effects of gender on negotiation outcomes. See, e.g.,
Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Kathleen L. McGinn, Constraints and Triggers: Situation-
al Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 952-58, 962
(2005). One example is to decrease situational and structural ambiguity, which means specifying
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legitimate reason to treat disparate impact claims differently in the con-
text of sex-based compensation practices.'57 But the internal causal narra-
tive of women's own responsibility for the gender wage gap-our failure
to lean in, to speak up, and to just ask-is so pervasive and entrenched
that it has rendered the employer's pay-setting practice invisible. Apply-
ing the social model of disability to the gender wage gap renders visible
the multiple necessary causes of gender pay disparities and focuses atten-
tion on the employer's causal role.
The social model thus supports elimination of the Bennett Amend-
ment from Title VII (or at least elimination of the factor other than sex
defense from the four defenses that the Amendment currently incorpo-
rates). While this proposal is similar to the PFA and to other scholars'
proposals for interpreting or applying the EPA's factor other than sex
defense more narrowly, 58 eliminating the Bennett Amendment from
Title VII would go further toward leveling the playing field for Title VII
claims, and it would do so by directly addressing the source of the prob-
lem.
The PFA only amends the EPA, and it does so by narrowing but not
eliminating the factor other than sex defense. The PFA would amend the
EPA to allow the factor other than sex defense to apply only to "a bona
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience."'
159
The PFA then tracks the steps in a conventional Title VII disparate im-
pact claim, by requiring an employer to demonstrate that the factor is
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and allowing employ-
ees to demonstrate "that an alternative employment practice exists that
more clearly "how parties are supposed to interact with one another," and making explicit the "eco-
nomic structure of the negotiation," such as letting parties know "the limits of the bargaining range
and appropriate standards for agreement." Id. (describing the results of two empirical studies). Based
on that research, women could argue that a less discriminatory alternative pay-setting practice would
structure wage negotiations to decrease situational and structural ambiguity in how the interaction
should proceed and in the economic parameters of the bargaining range. See id.
157. See Perry, supra note 87, at 184 (arguing that "applying standard Title VI disparate
impact doctrine to any claim of sex-based wage discrimination should result in analysis which is
indistinguishable from that done in other disparate impact claims").
158. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 90, at 1114-17 (interpreting the factor other than sex defense
narrowly to conclude that "[i]f an employer were to succumb to male bargaining entreaties with
respect to jobs that are substantially equal to those of women who do not ask about the possibility of
more advantageous employment terms, the women would have claims under the EPA"); Elzer, supra
note 52, at 2-3, 9, 21 (arguing that salary negotiation should not be deemed a valid factor other than
sex in an EPA claim because "gender differences in negotiation arise out of unequal bargaining
power"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 165-66, 195-203 (proposing to adopt the PFA's
amendment for limiting the "'any other factor other than sex' defense, but to jettison the uncapped
damage provision to make the bill more politically viable (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
proposal for amending the EPA that is most analogous to this Article's proposal for amending Ti-
tle VII is Professor Rabin-Margalioth's suggestion for changing the EPA so that mere proof that "a
female employee is compensated at a lower rate than a comparable male employee for the same
work" would "trigger[] the obligation to inquire whether this can be justified." See Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 808-09.
159. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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would serve the same business purpose without producing such differen-
tial." 60 Although this appears to be quite similar to a full revival of the
disparate impact doctrine, it continues to violate the defining feature of
disparate impact theory: the legal irrelevance of causal factors outside of
the employer. Although the PFA narrows the non-employer causes that
may be invoked to shield the employer from legal liability by ignoring
the necessary causal role that is also played by the employer's neutral
pay practice, that shield nonetheless remains. By leaving the Bennett
Amendment intact-which would then incorporate the narrower factor
other than sex defense into Title VII-the PFA would still allow room
for employers to avoid the causation blinders that are the defining feature
of the disparate impact doctrine in all other areas of Title VII law.
By focusing on the Bennett Amendment and reviving the disparate
impact doctrine, leveraging the social model of disability may help the
women's rights movement make headway on the gender pay gap without
having to take on the special treatment stigma that attaches to an accom-
modation right. The social model merely provides the theoretical basis
for delegitimizing the internal causal narrative of the gender pay gap,
thereby revealing the illegitimacy of the Bennett Amendment's "second
class treatment" of sex-based compensation discrimination claims.1
6
1
Using the social model toward this end is thus consistent with an equal
treatment and formal equality approach. Its objective is to bring Ti-
tle VII's protection for sex-based compensation discrimination up to the
same level as the protection that Title VII provides for all other statuses
in all other types of employment discrimination claims. 162
CONCLUSION
Causal narratives are enormously influential in directing not only
our social assessments of responsibility but also our legal assessments of
discrimination liability. The women don't ask narrative has been particu-
larly powerful. This narrative holds women themselves responsible for
the gender wage gap, and it buttresses a legal regime that allows employ-
ers to avoid liability for pay-setting practices that are built upon gender
stereotypes and that entrench gender pay inequality. Although the social
160. Id. § 3(a)(3)(B).
161. See Perry, supra note 87, at 184 (describing Title Vil's "unique and second class treat-
ment" for gender-based pay equity claims).
162. See id. at 158 (noting that "[t]he Bennett Amendment, by its terms, singles out sex-based
wage discrimination for different treatment under Title VII" (footnotes omitted)); see also Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 828 n.104 (arguing that reading the Bennett Amendment to rule out
disparate impact claims under Title VII "would lead to an implausible situation where two similar
claims of Title VII compensation discrimination, one claiming race or national origin base[d] dis-
crimination and the other claiming sex based discrimination, would not be offered the same scope of
protection"). The heightened protection for race and color in disparate treatment claims would still
exist in Title V1l's exemption of those statuses from the bona fide occupational qualification de-
fense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l), as would the modest accommodation right for religion, see id.
§ 2000e-2(e)(2).
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science research itself reveals this reality by demonstrating the role that
gender stereotypes play in creating and sustaining women's differential
negotiation approaches and results, the women don't ask causal narrative
is so pervasive that it needs a theoretical framework to help shift the in-
ternal causal attribution upon which the narrative rests. The social model
is a causal attribution theory that achieved a similar objective for disabil-
ity rights, by replacing the internal causal attribution of the medical mod-
el of disability with an external causal attribution that focused instead on
the employment practices that render various characteristics disabling.
As a causal attribution theory, the social model provides a useful tool for
the women's rights movement, which needs a way to make salient the
role that employers' wage-setting practices play in sustaining the gender
pay gap.
Challenging the legal relevance of the women don't ask narrative in
Title VII law is an important step, but it is likely only one of many steps
that will be needed to eventually bridge the gender pay gap. Placing sex-
based disparate impact compensation claims on par with all other types
of disparate impact claims is a critical start, but there are many ways in
which courts have undermined the transformative potential of the dispar-
ate impact doctrine more generally, which will also need attention. These
general issues include, among others, courts' unwillingness to character-
ize deeply entrenched employment norms and organizational structures
as "particular employment practices" that are subject to disparate impact
review.163 They also include courts' unwillingness to engage in deep
scrutiny under the business necessity defense.164 It is also hard to imagine
the gender pay gap ever disappearing without a major shift toward pay
transparency.165 But none of these proposed reforms will likely move
forward if we continue to allow the women don't ask causal narrative to
dominate the gender wage debate. It is time for the women's rights
movement to lean out by shifting our causal narrative away from women
and onto the workplace practices that render women's negotiation less
lucrative than men's.
163. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 609 (noting the problem of characterizing complex pay-
setting systems as particular employment practices for purposes of a disparate impact challenge);
Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 40, at 806-20 (proposing EEOC guidance that would "rede-
fine 'employment practice' to include workplace norms that often go unnoticed"); Michelle A.
Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3, 36-46, 77-91 (2005) (analyzing case law to reveal how courts treat default organiza-
tional structures as non-practices, thereby shielding them from a disparate impact challenge).
164. See Porter, Synergistic Sohtions, supra note 40, at 806-21 (proposing EEOC guidance to
"requir[e] a more searching business necessity inquiry"); Travis, supra note 21, at 360-68 (analyz-
ing case law indicating that "courts increasingly have deferred to employers' business decisions" and
urging a higher bar for the business necessity defense).
165. See generally Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1046 (arguing for pay transparency-i.e.,
"the ability for employees to find out what other employees in their workplace make"-as a way to
help address the gender pay gap).
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